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The Trans-Siberian Railway Bridge spanning the Yenisei River in Krasnoyarsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Russia. The bridge is crucial to Russia’s ongoing military effort in Ukraine. (Wikimedia Commons/VSerebrenikov)
Topic: Critical Infrastructure, and Land Warfare Blog Brand: The Buzz Region: Eurasia Tags: Eastern Europe, Russia, Trans-Siberian Railway, Ukraine, and Ukraine War Taking Out the Trans-Siberian Railway Bridge Could Cripple Russia’s War Machine February 20, 2026 By: Luke Coffey, and Can Kasapoglu
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A single bridge in central Russia connects the two halves of the country’s railway network—making an attractive target for a Ukrainian attack.
After more than a year of pursuing a negotiated track to bring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to a fair conclusion, it is clear that Russian leader Vladimir Putin has no real interest in reaching an agreement. Throughout this period, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly demonstrated his country’s willingness to pursue peace, agreeing to every ceasefire proposal, confidence-building measure, and exploratory dialogue put forward by US President Donald Trump. Putin, by contrast, has stalled, delayed, and engaged in talks only to prolong the conflict rather than resolve it.
Russia has learned that negotiations can be used as a weapon—buying time, exhausting Western patience, and hoping that divisions in the transatlantic community continue to grow. As long as the costs of continuing the war remain manageable, the Kremlin has little incentive to negotiate in good faith. If Trump wants to change Moscow’s calculus, Russia must be made to feel that the price of war is becoming unacceptably high.
That pressure does not need to come solely from sanctions or diplomacy. It can be delivered by the Ukrainians, too.
One of Russia’s greatest vulnerabilities lies in its internal infrastructure—specifically, the narrow set of assets that hold together the vastness of the world’s largest country. Among the most strategically significant of these assets is the Trans-Siberian Railway bridge over the Yenisei River in Krasnoyarsk, deep inside Siberia.
Striking the bridge would not come without controversy. Still, it is directly vital to Russia’s war against Ukraine—and is therefore a legitimate military target.
Why the Trans-Siberian Railway Bridge Matters
The Yenisei is one of the largest river systems in the world, running from southern Siberia to the Arctic Ocean. Despite its size, it is crossed by only a handful of major bridges, making it one of the least-bridged major rivers globally. The Trans-Siberian Railway crossing at Krasnoyarsk is the only high-capacity rail bridge on this route. There is no practical alternative elsewhere along the line. Put simply, a single piece of infrastructure connects European Russia to central Siberia and onward to the Pacific coast.
Every day, the bridge carries freight critical to sustaining the conflict: coal, metals, petroleum products, weapons, ammunition, and, of course, military equipment. Any military cargo originating in China or North Korea must pass over the bridge to reach western Russia and, ultimately, the battlefield in Ukraine.
The immediate impact of disabling this crossing would be severe. Rail traffic between western Russia and eastern Siberia would instantly come to a halt, creating cascading supply shortages across the country—including on the front lines in Ukraine. Depending on the season and environmental conditions, this disruption could last for months. Road and river transport lack the capacity to compensate, particularly during winter. Even temporary rail solutions would present extraordinary engineering challenges, while a full restoration of capacity could take years.
The economic consequences would be especially acute in Russia’s eastern regions, which rely heavily on westbound freight for industry, energy, and consumer goods. Backlogs, shortages, and rising prices would quickly follow. Over time, these economic shocks would translate into political pressure. Russia’s far-flung regions already feel distant from Moscow, both physically and politically. Areas such as Yakutia, Buryatia, and Tuva have histories of regionalism and low-level separatist sentiment, and the Russian military’s heavy recruitment from these areas has made the cost of the ongoing war keenly felt. A prolonged economic crisis could inflame those tensions.
Krasnoyarsk itself has long been associated with powerful business interests and organized crime networks. In a scenario where Moscow proves unable to resolve a major infrastructure failure, regional elites and criminal groups alike would grow increasingly frustrated with the center, creating additional instability for the Kremlin. In short, the destruction of a single strategic asset could have disproportionate national consequences.
US Intelligence Could Help Ukraine Destroy the Bridge
To be clear, striking such a target would be extraordinarily difficult. Damaging a rail bridge is far more complex than derailing a train or sabotaging tracks. It requires precise intelligence, careful planning, and specialized expertise. But Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity to innovate under pressure and operate far beyond the front lines. Previous operations deep inside Russian territory have already shown that distance alone does not guarantee safety for Moscow.
This is where the United States could quietly play a role. Washington could provide intelligence support, technical expertise, and planning assistance that would significantly improve Ukraine’s chances of success. Just as important, giving the green light to the Ukrainians to go after the bridge would mirror previous instances where Washington permitted Ukraine to target Russia’s energy sector. These attacks were mostly unheard of during the Biden administration, but with President Trump’s approval, they have inflicted serious costs on Russia and begun to reshape the strategic environment. Now more needs to be done.
The probability of success in an operation targeting the Trans-Siberian Railway bridge might be low, but the potential impact would be enormous. Russia cannot easily replace or bypass infrastructure of this magnitude. Nor can it conceal the consequences from its own population. In strategic terms, this is precisely the kind of geopolitical shock that can shake an adversary and force it to reconsider its options.
Until now, Ukraine has focused its efforts on destroying the Kerch Bridge connecting Russia with the Crimean Peninsula. That bridge has immense symbolic importance for Russia—legitimizing its seizure of Crimea in 2014—and destroying it would come with equal symbolic value for Ukraine. But on a strategic level, the bridge in Krasnoyarsk matters more. Kyiv should focus its efforts there instead.
As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine enters its fifth year and peace talks continue to stall, the Trump administration should think creatively and boldly about how to shift the balance. Helping Ukraine exploit Russia’s structural vulnerabilities would not guarantee peace. But it would make continued war far less comfortable for the Kremlin. And at this stage of the conflict, changing Russia’s cost-benefit calculation is exactly what is needed.
About the Authors: Luke Coffey and Can Kasapoğlu
Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. His work at Hudson analyzes national security and foreign policy, with a focus on Europe, Eurasia, NATO, and transatlantic relations. Mr. Coffey was previously director of the Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation from 2015 to 2022. In that role, he oversaw and managed a team covering most of Heritage’s foreign policy and international affairs work. From 2012 to 2015, he was the Margaret Thatcher fellow at Heritage, focusing on relations between the United States and the United Kingdom and on the role of NATO and the European Union in transatlantic and Eurasian security. Before joining Heritage, Mr. Coffey served at the UK Ministry of Defence as senior special adviser to then-British defence secretary Liam Fox.
Dr. Can Kasapoğlu is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. His work focuses on political and military affairs in the Middle East, North Africa, and the former Soviet regions. He specializes in open-source defense intelligence, geopolitical assessments, international weapons market trends, as well as emerging defense technologies and related concepts of operations. Dr. Kasapoğlu was previously a fellow at the NATO Defense College in Italy and a visiting scholar at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia. A military-scientist, Dr. Kasapoglu holds a PhD from the Turkish War College and an MSci from the Turkish Military Academy.
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Источник: nationalinterest.org