How Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War Threatens US Interests

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Topic: Diplomacy, and Land Warfare Blog Brand: The Buzz Region: Africa, and Middle East Tags: Donald Trump, East Africa, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Horn of Africa, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan, Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), Sudanese Civil War, and United States How Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War Threatens US Interests March 11, 2026 By: Liam Karr

The United States has much to lose from Ethiopia’s backing of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan—and the Trump administration should use its leverage to curtail it.

Ethiopia has become the newest co-belligerent in the Sudanese Civil War as the conflict approaches its three-year anniversary in April. Ethiopia’s growing role in Sudan complicates peace efforts, threatens to intertwine the Sudanese civil war with a brewing conflict in northern Ethiopia, and could undermine major US business deals in the country. Billions of dollars of US private and public investment into Ethiopia’s plans to become Africa’s largest air hub could—and should—be at risk if Ethiopia continues to fuel instability at the expense of US peace efforts and other US interests in the Red Sea and Middle East.

Ethiopia Is Backing the Rapid Support Forces

In late 2025, Ethiopia began allowing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a rebel faction located in southwestern Sudan, to use western Ethiopia as a rear base—seemingly at the behest of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the RSF’s main foreign backer and a close Ethiopian ally. Sudanese officials and open-source analysts have accused Ethiopia of hosting an Emirati-funded rear base for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) near its border with eastern Sudan. Reuters confirmed the existence of the base in early February 2026, estimating that over 4,000 RSF fighters were training at the base as of early January. The UAE has flown dozens of weapon shipments to Ethiopia that were tracked to the border area since November 2025.

Ethiopia has become more directly involved in backing the RSF throughout 2026. Flight tracking data shows that Ethiopian Airlines may be directly trafficking weapons to the RSF rear base in western Ethiopia since February 2026. At least two Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737-800s made a collective eight flights since February 23 along known UAE-linked weapons trafficking air corridors between Chad and western Ethiopia, using the military aprons of airports. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)–backed government separately claimed in early March that the RSF had been launching drone strikes from Ethiopia since February. Ethiopia formally denied the drone accusation, but all signs point toward deepening Ethiopian involvement in Sudan.

Ethiopia’s Pro-RSF Policy Is a Conundrum for the United States

This has unfolded as the Trump administration pushes to secure a humanitarian ceasefire in Sudan. The United States and Saudi Arabia sent a new ceasefire proposal to the warring Sudanese factions in January, and President Donald Trump’s Africa Advisor Massad Boulos was mediating competing proposals from both sides and discussing key points with their external backers throughout February. It is worth noting that SAF commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has vehemently rejected the notion of a ceasefire, although that position might change in the future and SAF diplomats have expressed a willingness to continue negotiations.

The alleged involvement of Ethiopian Airlines threatens to entangle US investments into Ethiopian air infrastructure with the Sudanese Civil War. Ethiopian Airlines is a major partner of American aerospace giant Boeing, and has purchased more than 50 Boeing aircraft, with the option for dozens more, since 2023. Boeing is also involved in US plans to support Ethiopia’s $12.5 billion mega-airport project, which will become Africa’s largest hub for air travel. The US International Trade Administration announced in August 2025 that the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) was potentially offering $1 billion in financing and $1 billion in political risk insurance to US firms involved in the project, and Boulos confirmed in October 2025 that the DFC and Boeing were collaborating on the project.

Ethiopian Airlines’ support for the RSF could cause reputational and legal liability for US investors. There has been mass condemnation of the RSF’s genocidal actions in Sudan, escalating calls from human rights advocates to cease business engagements with the UAE due to its support for the RSF. The RSF’s atrocious human rights record has also drawn bipartisan calls in the US Senate, led by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jim Risch (R-ID), to designate the RSF as a terrorist group. Such a designation would enable US officials to investigate and potentially prosecute any third parties helping provide material support to the RSF and impose sanctions on involved third parties. The Trump administration has already sanctioned individual RSF officials.

The Sudan Conflict Could Engulf East Africa—and the Middle East

Ethiopian involvement in the Sudanese civil war threatens to intertwine the Sudan conflict with other regional disputes around the Red Sea, further hampering the Trump administration’s peace efforts. The SAF has longstanding ties to the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in northern Ethiopia, which is on the verge of war with the federal government in Addis Ababa only a handful of years after the end of the devastating Tigray war in 2022. If Ethiopia persists in supporting the RSF, the SAF could retaliate by arming the TPLF and letting the TPLF use Sudan as a rear base.

Ethiopia’s entrance into Sudan’s civil war also intensifies regional proxy competition with Ethiopia’s regional rivals—Egypt and Eritrea. Egypt and Eritrea have both backed the SAF since the beginning of the war, partially due to Sudan’s role in their efforts to contain Ethiopia. Egypt views the SAF as an important stabilizing force on its long southern border with Sudan—and a reliable ally in its dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which lies in the same region of western Ethiopia as the RSF’s rear base. Similarly, Eritrea views a strong Ethiopia as an existential threat given their decades-long rivalry and more recent Ethiopian threats to annex Eritrean territory to secure sea access. Ethiopia has trained pro-SAF militias and partnered with the TPLF to help augment its deterrence forces and externalize the defense of its borders.

This proxy competition is not contained to Africa and extends across the Red Sea to an already-unstable Middle East. As covered in a recent AEI report, a regional rivalry in the Red Sea involving the UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar are layering over pre-existing African conflicts. Ethiopia is a major partner of the UAE and Israel, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt are closer to Eritrea. Elsewhere, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar have partnered with the SAF and Somalia, while the UAE has backed the RSF, and both Israel and the UAE have partnered with various Somali substate actors.

How the Trump Administration Can Rein Ethiopia In

Ultimately, Ethiopia lies at the heart of a regional tinderbox that threatens to undermine Trump’s peace frameworks in the Middle East and Africa, and cause tensions among US Middle Eastern partners at a time when they can ill afford distractions. Peace efforts in Sudan have become further convoluted with Ethiopian involvement, and escalating competition between Egypt and Ethiopia threatens to further undermine GERD negotiations, which Trump personally offered to mediate in January. Most importantly chaos in northern Ethiopia and across the Horn of Africa threatens to distract and divide US partners as they respond to Iran’s retaliatory attacks across the Middle East.

The administration is no doubt preoccupied with the war in Iran, but US officials should look to remain engaged with their African and Middle East counterparts to keep the situation stable. Trump dispatched the acting head of the State Bureau for African Affairs to discuss “regional peace and stability,” with the Ethiopian foreign minister in mid-February. The US Senate held a confirmation hearing on March 5 to appoint Frank Garcia as the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, raising the possibility of more dedicated African engagement as the administration shifts focus to the Middle East. As other senior officials engage with Middle East allies, they should ensure that tension points in the Red Sea remain on the list of discussion topics as needed.

Talk must also translate to action, and US officials should leverage US investments to boost cooperation with Ethiopia and dis-incentivize continued destabilizing activity. The US-backed International Monetary Fund has provided a multi-billion dollar bailout to help stabilize the Ethiopian economy amid a debt crisis that remains acute, especially amid donor fatigue from China, France, and other bilateral lenders. Continued US investment into Ethiopia’s air project is another clear point of leverage, as is potential US diplomatic and financial support to help Ethiopia secure improved commercial sea access. The United States should tie this engagement to Ethiopia respecting the sovereignty of its neighbors, and could even explore securing Ethiopian concessions on the GERD as part of bilateral US-Ethiopia talks.

Ethiopia’s entry to the Sudanese civil war is harmful to US business and national security interests. The Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea is facing a significant risk of a regional proxy war, and Ethiopia lies at the heart of many of these tensions. US officials should use what bandwidth they have to leverage the powerful financial toolkit at their disposal. Ignoring the issue will only jeopardize billions of dollars of US investment—and threaten to create a distraction that the United States and its Middle East partners can ill afford. 

About the Author: Liam Karr

Liam Karr is the Africa team lead for the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. He covers US national security in sub-Saharan Africa. He graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a B.A. in Political Science, History, and Arabic and an International Security Studies Certificate. Follow him on X/Twitter: @liam_karr.

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Источник: nationalinterest.org