The Superalloy Dilemma: Can America Break Its Mineral Dependency?

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Topic: Rare Earth Minerals Blog Brand: Techland Region: Americas Tags: Defense Industrial Base, Department of Energy (DOE), Elk Creek Project, F-35 Lightning II, Hafnium, Nebraska, Niobium, North America, Tantalum, Titanium, Tungsten, and United States The Superalloy Dilemma: Can America Break Its Mineral Dependency? January 5, 2026 By: Macdonald Amoah, Morgan Bazilian, and Jahara Matisek

America’s technological dominance in terms of military hardware risks being put in jeopardy if it cannot access the rare earth minerals needed to construct it.

A material science innovation is unfolding that may help redefine American economic and military power. In a new paper in Science magazine, researchers announced that they have forged a new “super alloy” of niobium, tantalum, titanium, and hafnium that is designed to be incredibly strong and incredibly hard to break, even at extreme temperatures. It exhibits unprecedented strength and a record-breaking resistance to fracture from the freezing void of outer space (-270°C) to the heat of volcanic lava (800°C).

Breakthroughs of this type offer the United States a decisive economic and military advantage. Unfortunately, that promise is hostage to adversary-dominated supply chains. Both China and Russia have demonstrated a clear willingness to weaponize their control over rare minerals by cutting off exports to achieve political aims. Production and adoption of this type of superalloy would only intensify this vulnerability. 

The Importance of Strategic Minerals in American Military Dominance

For the United States military, the strategic prize is technological “overmatch.” The new alloy’s unparalleled strength-to-weight ratio and thermal stability would allow for a generational leap in military hardware. Its ability to withstand the hellish temperatures of Mach 5 flight could make it a good fit for hypersonic missiles and next-generation jet engines. Its durability under extreme pressure makes it essential for critical components in advanced nuclear reactors and submarines. In combat, its superior toughness offers the potential to create kinetic penetrators that deliver greater destructive power compared to current tungsten alloys, but without the radiological risks of depleted uranium. It still faces the difficult process of moving into manufacturing and sales, however. 

The promise of any new alloy, however, is secondary to the reality of the rare earth minerals that compose it. Niobium, tantalum, titanium, and hafnium are already the bedrock of America’s military and economic strength. The supply chains for these minerals are not a future vulnerability; rather, they are a current and clear danger to US defense and aerospace platforms. For instance, the niobium-strengthened alloy Inconel 718 makes up as much as half the weight of modern jet engines, the very heart of American airpower. Airframes, such as an F-35, depend on Ti-6Al-4V, the most common titanium alloy, for its critical strength-to-weight ratio. This dependency extends even to the frontiers of space and hypersonic flight, where the niobium-hafnium-titanium alloy C-103 is essential for hypersonic vehicles and nozzles for rockets. Yet, all of them are imperiled by the same ugly reality: America does not control the minerals needed to build them. As an example, the United States is 100 percent import-reliant for the niobium, tantalum, and titanium sponge.

Four Ways to Get the Minerals of the Future

The path forward to secure the minerals needed for current and future superalloys requires four major steps. 

First, the United States must aggressively recapitalize the National Defense Stockpile. Once a bulwark against wartime shortages, it is now a shadow of its former self, with a shortfall estimated at over $14 billion. Recent congressional funding is a welcome start, but it must be the down payment on a sustained national commitment to acquiring and holding strategic reserves of materials like hafnium, which is alarmingly absent from the stockpile’s inventory.

Second, America must champion domestic sourcing to rebuild its industrial sovereignty. The Elk Creek Project in Nebraska is one possibility for this strategy. Crucially, the deposit also contains a significant titanium resource, offering a pathway to mitigate another severe import dependency. Projects of this strategic importance must be treated as national security priorities, with federal backing offered to overcome financing hurdles.

Third, Washington must complement its domestic efforts with a “friend-shoring” strategy, building resilient supply chains with trusted partners — a recent agreement with Australia is a good step in that direction. This includes joint investment in mining and processing facilities, collaborative research and development, and coordinated stockpiling efforts. However, this collaborative approach should supplement, never supplant, the urgent and foundational work of rebuilding America’s industrial power.

Finally, a truly durable strategy must look beyond the mine and embrace waste-to-value possibilities. Investing in the technology needed to recycle complex alloys and recover rare earth minerals from waste streams is not a luxury but a national security necessity. Fortunately, a template is emerging. The Department of Energy’s recent $134 million investment to recover rare earth minerals from waste is a welcome start, but this model must now be scaled and specifically targeted toward the strategic materials.

The discovery of this new superalloy is another strategic warning about the mineral supply chain risk to the US’s industrial base. Securing the minerals is no longer a niche industrial concern; it is already shaping great power competition. American power and prosperity in the 21st century will be determined by a fundamental choice: a future of material dependency or the resolve to seize the nation’s material destiny.

About the Authors: Macdonald Amoah, Morgan D. Bazilian, and Lt. Col. Dr. Jahara “Franky” Matisek

Macdonald Amoah is an independent researcher with interests across critical mineral supply chains, advanced manufacturing gaps, the industrial base, and the geopolitical risks in the mining sector.

Morgan D. Bazilian is the director of the Payne Institute for Public Policy and a professor at the Colorado School of Mines. Previously, he was lead energy specialist at the World Bank and has over two decades of experience in energy security, natural resources, national security, energy poverty, and international affairs.

Lt. Col. Jahara “Franky” Matisek (PhD) is a US Air Force command pilot, nonresident research fellow at the US Naval War College and the Payne Institute for Public Policy, and a visiting scholar at Northwestern University. He has published over 150 articles on industrial base issues, strategy, and warfare.

Image: Shutterstock/Mr. Tempter

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Источник: nationalinterest.org