«Данное сообщение (материал) создано и (или) распространено иностранным средством массовой информации, выполняющим функции иностранного агента, и (или) российским юридическим лицом, выполняющим функции иностранного агента»
Topic: Air Warfare, and Foreign Leaders Blog Brand: Middle East Watch Region: Middle East Tags: Ali Khamenei, Ali Larijani, Iran, Iran War, Islamic Republic, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Israel, Mojtaba Khamenei, and United States Iran After Larijani and Khamenei March 21, 2026 By: Charbel Antoun
Share
The killings of Ali Khamenei and Ali Larijani have pushed the Islamic Republic into its most acute crisis since 1979.
The assassination of Ali Larijani on March 17 has shattered what remained of Iran’s fragile leadership, accelerating its descent into a fractured autocracy—defiant in ideology but paralyzed in function. Just weeks after the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Larijani’s elimination removed the last credible link between the clerics, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and President Masoud Pezeshkian’s reformist‑leaning government. With no unifying authority and relentless bombardment underway, Tehran now faces its most vulnerable moment.
Khamenei’s death set off a rapid succession process. On March 8, the Assembly of Experts elevated his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to the supreme leadership. Since then, Mojtaba has not appeared in any independently verified footage; every message has been filtered through state media, stressing military defiance and urging Gulf states to expel US forces. Officials continue to deny persistent rumors that he was seriously injured in the opening strikes. Still, the absence of transparent visuals has only deepened doubts about his ability to control the state.
Without Larijani’s stabilizing influence, factional rivalries have only deepened. IRGC hardliners are likely pushing to dominate under Mojtaba’s nominal leadership, while senior clerics and figures like parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf angle for their own advantage. The result is mounting disorder: conflicting directives, stalled decision‑making, and a growing risk of internal purges. No single figure commands the uncontested authority Khamenei once held, leaving the system exposed to paralysis at a moment of maximum vulnerability.
Militarily, the damage is severe. Larijani had been coordinating what remained of Iran’s command structure after the deaths of IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour, Defense Council chief Ali Shamkhani, and much of the senior naval leadership. Since late February, US and Israeli forces have carried out dozens of precision strikes, gutting Iran’s conventional capabilities—its navy, air defenses, and missile‑production sites. What survives is a patchwork of IRGC units operating on pre‑war contingency plans rather than under a unified command.
Nowhere is this fragmentation more visible than in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s last meaningful point of leverage. Larijani had cast the strait as either a “route of peace and prosperity” for cooperative actors or a “strait of defeat” for adversaries. Without his calibration, IRGC units are more likely to act on impulse: swarming speedboats, drone strikes on commercial tankers, or autonomous cells laying mines without central approval. Each of these raises the odds of miscalculation and makes any path to de‑escalation far more precarious.
The operational toll is unmistakable. Commercial traffic has plunged as war‑risk insurers tighten coverage and premiums spike. One of the latest casualties—the Thai‑flagged Mayuree Naree, struck near the strait—was confirmed by both Iranian media and international outlets as a deliberate hit. With the Strait of Hormuz normally carrying roughly 20 percent of global seaborne oil, the slowdown has been dramatic, keeping Brent crude prices pinned between $90 and $ 120 per barrel.
US forces report destroying several suspected Iranian minelayers and support vessels, but the psychological deterrent remains. President Donald Trump has seized on UN Security Council Resolution 2817—passed on March 11 by a 13–0–2 vote, with China and Russia abstaining—to press for an international naval coalition. The resolution condemns Iran’s “egregious attacks” on Gulf states and demands an end to “actions aimed at interfering with maritime trade.” Trump’s pledge that “we will soon get the Hormuz Strait OPEN, SAFE, and FREE” now carries the weight of multilateral backing.
Regionally, Iran looks increasingly isolated. Hezbollah and the Houthis remain active but are under heavy pressure. Moscow and Beijing have limited themselves to verbal criticism of US-Israeli strikes and abstained from Resolution 2817. Still, neither has offered direct military support or the kind of large‑scale economic relief Tehran urgently needs.
Domestically, the regime’s grip is growing tenuous. Full‑strength sanctions have gutted oil revenue, driven inflation higher, and strained basic services. Youth and ethnic‑minority regions—Baluch, Kurdish, Arab—remain volatile amid economic collapse and wartime hardship. Pre‑war protests once drew millions, but the current wave of strikes has produced a mix of nationalist rallying around the surviving leadership and forcibly suppressed dissent. Public appearances by remaining officials ring increasingly hollow against the backdrop of civilian casualties and precision strikes on IRGC sites.
Three weeks after Khamenei’s assassination and now Larijani’s confirmed killing, the Islamic Republic still exists on paper—its constitution intact, its slogans unchanged. But the machinery that once enforced those slogans is under unprecedented strain. The targeted strikes have exposed how dependent the system was on a handful of pivotal figures. With them gone, ideology alone cannot keep the system upright. Whether the next phase brings negotiated concessions, an IRGC power grab, or deeper fragmentation, the direction is unmistakable: Iran is no longer projecting power. It is fighting to survive.
About the Author: Charbel Antoun
Charbel A. Antoun is a Washington-based journalist and writer specializing in US foreign policy, with a focus on the Middle East and North Africa. He is passionate about global affairs, conflict resolution, human rights, and democratic governance, and explores the world’s complexities through in-depth reporting and analysis.
The post Iran After Larijani and Khamenei appeared first on The National Interest.
Источник: nationalinterest.org