«Данное сообщение (материал) создано и (или) распространено иностранным средством массовой информации, выполняющим функции иностранного агента, и (или) российским юридическим лицом, выполняющим функции иностранного агента»
Topic: Foreign Leaders Blog Brand: Silk Road Rivalries Region: Eurasia Tags: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Caucasus, Central Asia, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Ukraine War, Uzbekistan, and Vladimir Putin Can Russia Revitalize the CSTO? January 23, 2026 By: Justin Mitchell
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The Ukraine War has raised serious questions about the credibility of the post-Soviet defense bloc.
For the first time since 2020, the Russian Federation assumed the rotating chairmanship of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Eurasian military alliance including Russia, Belarus, and most of Central Asia.
At the CSTO Summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, on November 27, 2025, Russian president Vladimir Putin proposed “a large-scale programme to supply the collective forces with modern Russian weapons and military equipment, which have proven their effectiveness in military operations on the ground.” This proposal also includes developing air force and air defense systems, collaboration of defense industry enterprises, and information security. Putin also plans to deliver modern weapons and equipment to the other member states.
However, Russia enters the chairmanship at a time when the CSTO faces many problems that could complicate Putin’s ability to deliver on the extensive proposals. The CSTO continues to face a mixture of criticism and skepticism. It has failed to come to the aid of its member-states, like Armenia. Meanwhile, Russia’s war in Ukraine has drawn away the attention and resources of the organization’s most powerful member. Time will tell if Russia can successfully reinvigorate the alliance.
Should Russia follow through on its proposals for the CSTO, it will bolster this alliance. Otherwise, Russia’s 2026 chairmanship will simply prolong the survival of a struggling military alliance.
Just over a month after the CSTO’s peacekeeping intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022, Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine, with Belarus being the only other CSTO member joining Moscow. Central Asian states showed their displeasure by refusing to recognize the Russian-occupied territories. However, most refrained from condemning Russia for invading Ukraine at the UN to avoid infuriating Moscow.
As the war enters its fourth year, the CSTO remains uninvolved in Ukraine and will continue to abstain from officially participating. While most of the member states have been spared from participating in the war in Ukraine, Russia’s full commitment to fighting has led Moscow to sacrifice a lot of attention and resources to the organization.
The war in Ukraine restricts Moscow’s ability to follow through on its proposals in CSTO. When answering questions at the CSTO Summit in November 2025, President Putin admitted that the war in Ukraine was having a negative impact on Russia’s capabilities in the alliance: “It is perfectly clear that amid the special military operation, our capabilities for some components are currently not great. That is to say, they are substantial, but we must meet our own needs.”
Even though Russia is the most powerful military in the CSTO, eclipsing all the other member states in both personnel and resources, and its biggest supplier, the amount of arms exports to Central Asian states over the past several years pales in comparison to the amount sent to China, India, and other countries. This demonstrates that Moscow has more pressing geopolitical priorities than CSTO and Central Asia.
Following the trend, there has been a noticeable decrease in arms exports to Central Asia and the South Caucasus between 2021 and 2023, by 23 percent and 44 percent, respectively. In that same period, Russia was the primary supplier of arms to Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with Kazakhstan receiving nearly 90 percent and Tajikistan close to 100 percent of arms imports from Russia, with materials ranging from V-84 engines to SU-30 MK fighters. However, the Ukraine War has led the Central Asian states within the CSTO to diversify their arms imports from countries such as France, Spain, and Turkey.
As Russia returns to the CSTO chairmanship for the first time since 2020, with many proposals to maintain and strengthen the CSTO, there is merited skepticism about how much can be accomplished. The alliance has always struggled with delivering peace and security to the member states, with an inadequate response to the latest Nagorno-Karabakh clash leading to Armenia suspending its participation.
With Russia’s attention redirected to Ukraine and away from Central Asia, the sustainability of the CSTO is in question. Whether Russia can deliver on its proposals will determine whether this alliance receives the much-needed upgrade or just struggles on for another year.
About the Author: Justin Mitchell
Justin Mitchell is a DC-based foreign policy analyst with an MA in International Relations from Syracuse University. He was a Spring 2023 Marcellus policy fellow and studied in Almaty, Kazakhstan, for an academic year. Justin’s research interests include Central Asia, diplomacy, Eurasia, geopolitics, Russia, and US defense and national security policy.
Image: Pavel Mikheyev / Shutterstock.com.
The post Can Russia Revitalize the CSTO? appeared first on The National Interest.
Источник: nationalinterest.org